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ABSTRACT  
This study attempts to determine the impact of the rise of 
China and its increased presence in Cambodia on the local 
ethnic Chinese (LEC) community. The author conducted 
individual interviews with informants including the permanent 
secretary of a local Chinese association, the manager of a 
Chinese daily newspaper and the headmaster of a Chinese-
medium school to understand their views. The study found 
that there was little interaction between the LEC and new 
migrants (NMs) from the People’s Republic of China (PRC), as 
the LEC association and Chinese school focused mainly on 
serving the interests of the LEC community while the NM 
community has grown self-sufficient with their own 
organizations. It also found that the increased presence of NMs 
and capital from the PRC in Cambodia did not cause LEC to 
become more China-oriented. The main recipient of the soft 
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power diplomacy of PRC’s One Belt and One Road initiative 
were Khmer-speaking populace, regardless of their ethnic origin. 
Keywords: Chinese Cambodians, new Chinese migrants, One Belt and 
One Road 
The Rise of China and Local Ethnic Chinese (LEC)  
in Cambodia  
he tightening of relationship between Cambodia and China 
under Hun Sen’s rule along with the massive influx of people 
and capital from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) into 
Cambodia that resulted from it has been a focus of keen interest by 
media and scholars alike for quite some time. Many studies have 
approached this phenomenon from economic and military points 
of view. For instance, Chheang (2017) pointed out that PRC filled 
Cambodia’s need for performance legitimacy and countervailing 
force against its immediate neighbors. However, not many have 
studied this strengthening of Sino-Cambodian relationship from 
the perspective of the local ethnic Chinese (LEC) community in 
Cambodia.  
On the other hand, there have been studies that focused on the 
impact of PRC’s One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative and 
changes in its overseas Chinese policy. Suryadinata (2017) pointed 
out that, under OBOR, PRC now included even the individuals of 
Chinese birth or descent but without Chinese nationality within 
the target of its overseas Chinese policy. Previously, PRC had 
T
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maintained its principle adopted after Zhou Enlai attended the 
Bandung Conference in 1955 and formally engraved in the PRC 
nationality law of 1980, namely that once a Chinese national 
obtains a foreign citizenship, he or she ceases to be a Chinese 
national, which also means that he or she is no longer the object of 
PRC’s overseas Chinese policy.  
This study attempts to determine, therefore, the influence of 
China’s rise on the LEC community in Cambodia. Has the revival 
of ethnic Chineseness in Cambodia since the 1990s and the more 
recent strengthening of relations between the two countries really 
resulted in turning the LEC Cambodians so China-oriented, or is it 
somewhat more nuanced? Who are the main recipients of the 
impacts of PRC’s soft power diplomacy? These are the questions 
this study attempts to understand through the perspectives of the 
LEC. 
Definition of terms 
There is a variety of ways for conceptualizing the phenomenon 
of Chinese diaspora. It has been common however, to use Chinese 
overseas (haiwai huaren) as a blanket term that encompasses both 
those individuals outside of China who retain their Chinese 
nationality and those who became citizens of the countries they 
reside in either through birth or naturalization (Wang, 2004). 
Within Chinese overseas, the term overseas Chinese (huaqiao) has 
often been used to denote those who are Chinese citizens but have 
settled down in a foreign country. Huaren, on the other hand,  
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usually means those who do not have Chinese nationality but 
manifest signs of Chineseness, often through language use, 
customs, and value system. The term huayi has been used 
somewhat ambiguously: While it is often used to denote people of 
Chinese descent who have lost consciousness of Chineseness, it is 
sometimes also used analogously to Huaren, as can be seen in 
PRC’s issuance of huayi cards to huaren residents within China.  
For the purpose of this study, I will use the term local ethnic 
Chinese or LEC to cover both the huaren and huayi above. In other 
words, I will use LEC to differentiate the people of Chinese descent 
who have already been in Cambodia since before the 1990s from 
new migrants (xin yimin) or NMs, who started arriving en masse 
in post-UNTAC Cambodia from the PRC. One reason for using 
LEC as a generic term inclusive of both huaren and huayi in the 
conventional sense is the peculiar historical background of the 
Chinese diaspora in Cambodia. Until Lon Nol’s rule (1970-75), the 
Chinese community in Cambodia was had been thriving, and the 
majority of the population in the capital Phnom Penh was said to 
be ethnic Chinese. However, a persecution of Chinese ensued, and 
it culminated in a genocidal attempt by Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge to 
eradicate the entire Chinese population from Cambodia. Through 
this experience, many people of Chinese descent learned to 
Khmerize themselves as much as they could, either in pretention or 
in actuality. Although there has been a massive revival of 
Chineseness among LEC Cambodians after the arrival of peace in 
the early 1990s, it is often difficult to demarcate clearly between 
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huaren and huayi. It is normal for city dwellers in Cambodia to 
trace certain Chinese lineage with vastly varying degree of the 
retention of Chineseness (Inamura, 2011). What has become more 
prominent since the early 1990s, rather, is the contrast between the 
LEC community on the one hand, and NMs from the PRC on the 
other, which is more pronounced than the one between LEC and 
“pure” Khmers.  
Method 
The main data of this study was gathered through field work 
conducted in September 2018. It included personal interviews, 
text-based data, and linguistic landscape observations. The 
interviews were conducted with the permanent secretary of the 
Federation of Khmer Chinese in Cambodia (FKCC, Jianhua lishi 
zonghui), who was also the manager of Jian Hua Daily, a local 
Chinese-language newspaper, as well as the principal of the 
Association of Chinese Teochew in Cambodia Toun Fa Chinese 
School (Duanhua, TFCS), the largest-scale Chinese elementary and 
secondary school in Southeast Asia. (Inamura, 2011; Suryadinata, 
2017).  I also spoke with an owner of a Chinese-medium 
kindergarten in Phnom Penh. I conducted these interviews in 
Mandarin. Interviews were also conducted in English with the 
Khmer principal of an English-medium elementary and secondary 
school. The informants also included ordinary citizens of ethnic 
Khmer and Chinese backgrounds from the cities of Phnom Penh, 
Sihanoukville and Siem Reap. Many of these interviews were done  
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through my Khmer-speaking colleague. I also gathered locally 
published Chinese-language newspapers and textbooks. These 
newspapers are operated by and issued with LEC capital, but their 
targeted readership include both the LEC community and NMs. In 
addition, physical and linguistic landscapes of the three 
Cambodian cities were observed.  
Being an attempt to determine the impact of the rise of China 
on LEC community through the perspective of LEC individuals, 
this study does not claim to be an exhaustive empirical research, 
nor are the experiences of informants of this study generalizable to 
the LEC community as a whole. 
Impact of the rise of China on LEC-NM relations 
The increased influence and visibility of the PRC and NMs in 
Cambodia have had a paradoxical effect of pushing the LEC 
community further toward Khmerization, while still maintaining 
its advantage of having Chinese backgrounds. LEC’s interest in 
maintaining Chineseness is increasingly for utilitarian reasons, 
rather than the passing down of their ancestral heritage.  
LEC and NM organizations 
The main target of the works of associations, schools and LEC 
media is increasingly within the LEC communities, and their links 
and interactions with the PRC government and NMs seem to be 
becoming less prominent than they used to be during the period 
right after the opening up of post-UNTAC Cambodia. When the 
PETER IORI KOBAYASHI | THE RISE OF CHINA                                      7 
 
 
 
 
CHINESE STUDIES PROGRAM LECTURE SERIES    © Ateneo de Manila University 
No. 7, 2020: 1–24                                                                      http://journals.ateneo.edu 
 
LEC organizations retain links with the PRC, it is mainly for the 
benefit of the LEC communities. Although the LEC associations 
such as FKCC still function as a bridge between visiting Chinese 
delegations and high-ranking Cambodian officials, now that the 
presence of Chinese capital and NMs has become much more 
prominent in Cambodia, the NM communities have become more 
self-sufficient, and no longer require connections and services 
provided by the LEC associations.  
One evidence of this is the increased strength of NM 
associations and the relative lack of interactions between them and 
the LEC associations. In downtown Phnom Penh, I spotted many 
signboards for NM associations. Those are usually called chambers 
of commerce, for example, Fujian General Chinese Chamber of 
Commerce (Fujian zong shanghui). Through a telephone 
conversation with a leader of Chinese Chamber of Commerce in 
Cambodia (CCCC), which is an overarching organization of the 
chambers of commerce representing different parts of China, I 
understood that NMs already had a strong presence in Cambodia; 
and there even were separate organizations for various types of 
businesses operated by NMs. According to Goto (2011), CCCC is 
not a member of FKCC and, having been established under the 
auspices of the Chinese embassy, it has a close relationship with the 
PRC government. Another notable difference from the LEC 
groups is the wide range of places of origin in China. This is in 
contrast to the LEC organizations under FKCC, which bear the 
names of five traditional regional groups originating from  
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southern China, namely Teochew, Cantonese, Hokkien, Hakka, 
and Hainanese. In contrast, NM organizations cover all over China 
including central and northern China, and not necessarily related 
to the languages their members speak as Mandarin functions as the 
lingua franca. For example, there are “Association Development of 
Commerce Jiangxi in the Cambodia (sic)” and many other such 
organizations. According to the FKCC official I interviewed, there 
certainly are some nominal relations between FKCC and such NM 
organizations, but substantial interactions are few and far between, 
because the latter have already established strong ties with the 
Cambodian government.  
It does not mean, however, that the function of the LEC 
associations as a bridge between Cambodia and PRC has become 
completely obsolete. Just during the interview, I witnessed a 
busload of visitors from a regional government in Guangdong 
province to the FKCC headquarters. The meeting between FKCC 
officials and those visitors was reported on Jian Hua Daily the next 
day. And just several days before the interview, a high-ranking 
official from Chaozhou in Guangdong province met with Prime 
Minister Hun Sen through the brokerage of FKCC.  
LEC and the Cambodian government 
As an organization, FKCC serves and represents the interests of 
the LEC community, and according to the FKCC informant, the 
Cambodian government needs the organization. For instance, in 
the case of facilitating meetings between Chinese visitors and high-
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ranking Cambodian government officials, the Cambodian 
government needs FKCC for strengthening ties with the PRC. 
Furthermore, he said that the public service FKCC offers, 
including education and rescue work, is valued by the Cambodian 
government. Reflecting this cordial relationship with the 
government, the informant stated that the law enforced in 2015, 
which limits the activities of non-governmental organizations is 
not affecting FKCC at all. 
Chinese education 
Elementary and secondary education. Chinese schools clearly 
focus on educating local children, both LEC and Khmer, and have 
little direct connections with NMs or the PRC, except in importing 
teachers and receiving help with teaching materials. According to 
the principal of Toun Fa Chinese School (TFCS), the vast majority 
of pupils are locals, and there is a significant number of non-
Chinese Khmer pupils among them, whose parents opted for 
Chinese education in the hope of obtaining better employment 
prospects as Mandarin speakers. Indeed, it has even been reported 
that children of Cambodian government officials with non-
Chinese ethnic backgrounds study at TFCS (Kawase, 2017). 
Whether Chinese or Khmer, the majority of the parents speak 
neither Mandarin nor any other Chinese language, because many 
of them grew up during the period when Chinese education was 
prohibited or shortly thereafter.  
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Very few NM children go to TFCS. The principal explained that 
NMs usually do not bring their children with them to Cambodia, 
and if they do, they prefer to send them to international schools for 
expatriates in Phnom Penh, in the hope of sending them to 
universities in the West or China in the future. With a curriculum 
that caters for local children, TFCS is not an attractive option for 
NMs. 
It is clear from the curriculum that TFCS, like other Chinese 
schools in Cambodia, is focusing on the local market. TFCS places 
much importance on bridging to the local Khmer curriculum. The 
principal stated that students attend at least four hours a week of 
Khmer public-school subjects, taught by part-time Khmer teachers 
from nearby public schools. It reflects the fact that the majority of 
graduates hope to further their studies in public universities in 
Cambodia. Since on average only seven to eight students aim to 
enter universities in China per year, it is natural that most students 
focus more on subjects taught in Khmer than in Chinese. They can 
even take the Cambodian baccalaureate in Chinese and study 
Chinese at a university in Cambodia. The KFCC informant 
disclosed that there even is a plan to open a local Chinese-medium 
university, the first of its kind in Southeast Asia.  
At home, the primary family language for of the pupils is 
Khmer. Even in families in which both parents are of Chinese 
descent, it is rare that Mandarin or Chinese dialects are spoken in 
any significant manner at home, as the LEC understood during the 
Pol Pot era how devastating the potential consequences of 
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excessively emphasizing Chineseness could be. It can be seen from 
here that those LEC are quite profoundly Khmerized, and regard 
Chinese education in a purely utilitarian light, rather than a means 
for maintaining and passing on Chinese culture and traditions. 
It is, by no means, that the increased presence of the PRC in 
Cambodia did not have much impact on local Chinese schools 
aside from the fact that they were allowed to reopen in the first 
place. One area in which Chinese schools in Cambodia is 
benefiting from Cambodia’s renewed closeness with the PRC is in 
the development of teaching materials. FKCC used to utilize 
textbooks prepared by the United Chinese Committees 
Association of Malaysia (Dong zong) and the United Chinese 
School Teachers Association of Malaysia (Jiao zong) in the 
secondary level. However, more recently, it has adopted original 
teaching materials prepared by Jinan University in China. Even the 
textbooks for the primary level, which used to be prepared locally, 
have now been replaced with those produced jointly with Jinan 
University and published by FKCC. These materials illustrate the 
increased familiarity between the two countries where the contents 
of the Chinese textbook for the primary level refer to cultures, 
histories and geographical names of both China and Cambodia. 
Another area in which the closer relationship with the PRC has 
had an impact on is in the recruitment of teachers. FKCC estimates 
that a total of 1,200 extra Chinese teachers are needed in Chinese 
schools all over Cambodia, and the PRC has recently agreed to 
dispatch 223 teachers to the country. Aside from teachers from  
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China who visit TFCS on temporary basis, TFCS is likely to benefit 
also from this scheme. The PRC government is also granting 
scholarship to 200 LEC and Khmer students who are studying at 
Chinese schools.  
Kindergartens. Across Phnom Penh, signboards in practically 
monolingual in simplified Chinese for “international” 
kindergartens were observable. I spoke with an owner of one such 
kindergarten in downtown Phnom Penh. She was an NM from 
mainland China and spoke in Mandarin. She said that the children 
in her kindergarten were mostly from NM families whose parents 
wanted basic education in Mandarin Chinese, but also hoped to 
have a head start in English. There were very few local Khmer or 
Chinese children, although the kindergarten later added a banner 
written in Khmer underneath the Chinese sign. However, the 
kindergarten also offered night classes in conversational Chinese 
for Khmer-speaking general public.  
International schools. Chinese-medium schools like TFCS and 
public schools are not the only choice for the children of LEC 
Cambodian families. Signboards and school buses belonging to so-
called international schools were ubiquitous in all three 
Cambodian cities I visited. Those are not schools for expatriate 
children that adopt such international curricula as the 
international baccalaureate, but locally run schools in which part 
of the classes are offered in the English medium. Many of such 
schools advertised prospects for further studies in Singapore and 
Thailand. I visited one such private international school in Phnom 
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Penh, where I interviewed the headmaster. The site was a branch of 
a school that had 21 locations throughout Phnom Penh and had 
approximately 30,000 pupils altogether. This particular campus 
had 1,800 students in its K-12 programs. Even though there is no 
survey of the pupils’ ethnic origins, it is safe to presume that a 
sizeable proportion of them are ethnic Chinese, given the general 
ethnic composition of the socioeconomic class in Phnom Penh to 
which many of the pupils’ families belong. The fee is 
approximately $100 per month, and secondary pupils receive 20 
hours of tuition per week. About 30% of the pupils attend public 
schools in addition to coming to this school six days a week. The 
school offers Khmer classes in the morning, taught mainly by part-
time teachers from public schools, and English-medium classes in 
the afternoon. About 40% of the pupils enter the local university 
affiliated with the group where faculty members are recruited from 
Singapore and India, while some others choose to further their 
studies in Singapore or English-medium universities in 
neighboring Thailand. As in the case of Indonesia where ethnic 
Chinese are spearheading the Englishization of private education, 
the LEC community in Cambodia also seems to be playing an 
important role in the popularity of English-medium schools.   
Chinese media 
At the time of the field trip, there were five major paper-based 
Chinese dailies. My informant at FKCC was also the manager of 
Jian Hua Daily, one of the Chinese daily newspapers. All but one of  
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the papers are LEC-owned. Another important daily, the 
Huashang Daily, is owned by Pung Kheav Se, an executive director 
of Canadia Bank.  
All of the Chinese dailies now use simplified Chinese characters 
promoted by the PRC, although Inamura (2011) reported that they 
used traditional Chinese characters in the late 1990s. Although the 
stories reported in those LEC-owned newspapers are mainly local 
news and visits of Chinese delegations, many of the classified 
advertisements apparently target Chinese nationals, indicating that 
NMs are included in the target readership.  
The only paper-based daily operated by NMs is Jinbian 
Wanbao, an evening daily, issued by Chinese Chamber of 
Commerce in Cambodia, a blanket organization of NM 
associations. One reason of for the small number of NM 
newspapers in Cambodia is that NMs rely on the internet for 
getting news, networking, and gaining information on potential 
business partners in China. There are many such websites, and 
Jinbian Wanbao itself relies heavily on online presence, the server 
for which is located in mainland China. On the other hand, the 
LEC readership of Chinese-language media are mainly those who 
received education before the 1970s when the Chinese education 
was banned. This explains this phenomenon in which most paper-
based Chinese media are LEC-centered while NM ones are mostly 
web-based.  
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Linguistic landscape 
The observation of language use in street signs also revealed the 
further blending of LECs with local Khmer society and the influx 
of NMs who are self-sufficient with little contacts with Khmers. 
Use of traditional Chinese alongside Khmer and English was 
representative of localized LEC or Khmer-owned businesses, while 
NM presence was signified by signs practically monolingual in 
simplified Chinese, sometimes accompanied by pinyin 
transliterations, despite the law regulating all public signs should 
have Khmer in the most conspicuous position (Dara, 2018).  
Phnom Penh. In downtown Phnom Penh, most medium- to 
large-scale commercial establishments had signs trilingually in 
Khmer, English, and traditional Chinese. Those shops also 
typically had Chinese-style altars for deities and couplets written in 
traditional Chinese. These were very common even in locally 
owned shops that seemed to have no Chinese backgrounds at all. 
Since the majority of city-dwellers in pre-DK Cambodia were 
Chinese, these customs have been accepted widely by the business 
sector in Cambodia in general. Most younger generation 
Cambodians, Chinese or otherwise, cannot decipher the meanings 
of those messages in Chinese.  
However, it was also observable that some businesses had signs 
in simplified Chinese as well as Khmer. Those were recognizable as 
NM-owned establishments. On Diamond Island, one area of 
Phnom Penh where there is a large presence of NMs, there were 
many signs written only in simplified Chinese, sometimes even 
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accompanied by transliterations in pinyin. This shows that those 
shops do not consider locals or non-NMs to be part of their 
clientele. It can be understood from here that the NM presence is 
large enough for it to be economically independent and self-
sufficient, without the need to rely on non-NM customers. Indeed, 
one of the restaurants I visited had its menu written monolingually 
in simplified Chinese.  
Sihanoukville. In the resort city of Sihanoukville, where 90% of 
the businesses are Chinese-owned, signs written in simplified 
Chinese were extremely common, and those sometimes had no 
Khmer or English written at all, which is against the law (Dara, 
2018; Pisei, 2019). It was almost reminiscent of being in China. 
Many of the products those signs advertised were targeted at 
customers from northern China, which is not the traditional 
homeland of LEC. The only places where I saw traditional Chinese 
signs and couplets were clearly Khmer-owned with little trace of 
Chineseness otherwise. There were many high-rise resort hotels 
under construction along the beach, and they mostly had signs of 
government-related construction companies from the PRC, 
written monolingually in simplified Chinese. 
Siem Reap. Even though a large proportion of visitors to this 
tourist center is from China, many of the shop signs were in 
English, reflecting a history of international tourism that had 
existed long before the influx of Chinese tourists started. 
Throughout my stay in Cambodia, here only was I often solicited 
by street vendors and tricycle drivers in Japanese. In all other 
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Cambodian locations, the main language of peddling was 
Mandarin. However, here too it was possible to observe the 
presence of NM businesses. 
Ordinary LEC citizens 
During my field work, I also spoke with LEC citizens who were 
small- to medium-scale business owners. While some of them had 
benefitted from their Mandarin ability in doing business with 
NMs, they also said that they shunned from Sihanoukville about 
which they complained of the presence of “too many” NMs. They 
claimed that the security situation in Sihanoukville, which had 
been a favorite resort town for them in the past, has worsened 
since the arrival of NMs and Chinese tourists en masse; so much so 
that they advised me not to go there, or be extremely careful if I 
really had to. Judging from this episode, although LECs initially 
benefitted from their Chinese backgrounds, now they have little 
contact with them and even regard NM presence as a threat, or at 
least not benefitting directly from China’s strong presence in 
Cambodia in recent years.  
Impact of OBOR   
OBOR involves both investing in large-scale projects in 
infrastructure and spreading of soft power through promotion of 
Chinese language and culture. The main recipients of the benefits 
of the former are the general public including both Khmers and 
NM contractors and construction workers. The ones benefitting 
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from the latter, on the other hand, include both Khmer general 
public and LECs.  
Investment projects 
The main beneficiaries of contracting of infrastructure projects 
are NMs and Chinese citizens who are associated with Cambodian 
operations of PRC’s state-owned companies. Pal (2014) explained 
that local operations of Chinese state firms conducted needs 
analyses of infrastructure projects and proposed them to 
Cambodian government authorities. Many such projects were 
financed with bilateral aid from the PRC. Once agreed upon, they 
would then find NM subcontractors, who in turn hire Khmer and 
NM workers, at the same time recruiting more highly skilled 
workers directly from China. Pal specifically mentioned that his 
interviewee deliberately avoided dealing with local (including LEC) 
companies, because she had had run into payment problems with 
them in the past, and specialized in collaborating with Chinese 
state-owned firms. Chheang (2017) pointed out that Cambodian 
workers were limited to unskilled low-level labor, and local 
companies did not benefit from spill-over effects of Chinese 
investments, such as technology transfer and increased 
international visibility. As in the cases of nearby countries like 
Malaysia, LEC-owned firms not only do not benefit from the 
Chinese investments, they may even suffer from increased 
competition from both PRC and NM companies as a result of 
Chinese investment (Ngeow & Tan, 2018). 
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Soft power promotion 
Although the goal of the PRC’s effort to spread Chinese culture 
includes re-Sinification of Chinese overseas, the larger Khmer 
community is the main beneficiary of the soft power promotion as 
part of OBOR (Suryadinata, 2017). As was discussed earlier, China 
is sending many Chinese-language teachers to Cambodia. The vast 
majority of the students in such schools are from local Khmer-
speaking backgrounds, with a significant number of non-Chinese 
Khmers. From Facebook pages of those schools, one can observe 
that many participants in Chinese speech contests and cultural 
competitions, many of which presumably are supported or even 
sponsored by the PRC, are overtly non-Chinese. Textbooks used in 
such schools are mostly produced locally by FKCC, with assistance 
from the PRC government, as those are the only ones officially 
sanctioned by the Cambodian government (Goto, 2011).  
Major Chinese bookstores in Phnom Penh also exhibited 
evidence that the main target clientele were the local Khmer 
speakers. Chinese as a second language teaching materials written 
in English and published in the PRC dominated one such 
bookstore, where there also was a large selection of local 
educational books written monolingually in Khmer. Unlike 
Chinese internet cafes proliferating in the streets of the Cambodian 
capital, it was evident that such bookshops were not meant to serve 
the needs of NMs or the sizable expatriate community of PRC 
nationals, as they did not offer popular current publications in 
China, except those authored by PRC president Xi Jinping.  
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Conclusion 
Fieldwork and interviews suggested that the LEC society is no 
longer functioning as a bridge for NMs into the Cambodian 
society. The main focus of the LEC associations and schools is to 
serve the local LEC community, which has assimilated into the 
Khmer culture and has become predominantly Khmer-speaking. 
The NMs and expatriate community of PRC nationals have grown 
self-sufficient and already have strong links with the Cambodian 
government, and they do not need to rely on the brokerage of local 
Chinese anymore. Perhaps with the exception of Khmer-Chinese 
bilinguals employed in the lower echelons of Chinese corporations 
and infrastructure projects, it is possible for a Chinese corporation 
to rely entirely on China-born NMs. Today, it is possible for a NM 
to maintain his/her livelihood in Cambodia with little interaction 
with Khmers (Inamura, 2011).   
The influx of the Chinese capital did not place the majority of 
the LEC in a privileged position. If anything, it has caused LEC-
owned small businesses to face harsher competition coming from 
Chinese counterparts. While it is true that the flourishing of 
Chinese culture after a long period of persecution did contribute to 
the revitalization of Chinese identity among LEC, the recent wave 
of Chinese investment in Cambodia does not seem to be causing 
them to become more China-oriented. 
The target of the soft power export to Cambodia that is 
accompanying the OBOR project seems to be mainly the local 
Khmer-speaking populace, with Chinese ancestry or otherwise.  
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A rise of anti-Chinese sentiment has surfaced when a Chinese-
owned building under construction collapsed killing 28 workers in 
Sihanoukville in June 2019 (Turton & Sokummono, 2019). An 
expert regards the subsequent sacking of government officials as an 
attempt to appease the simmering anti-Chinese sentiment among 
the local populace (Lipes, 2019; H. Yamada, personal communication, 
June 26, 2019). Future research can closely observe this anti-Chinese 
sentiment and its impact on the LEC society in Cambodia. 
Another development worth a researcher’s attention would be 
the removal of illegal shop signs in Sihanoukville. As stated earlier, 
signs carrying no or incorrect Khmer scripts although illegal, were 
largely condoned at the time of this study. However, a crackdown 
has started in Sihanoukville of such signage (Dara, 2018). The 
official quoted in a news report stated that the problem was caused 
by the fact that signage-making businesses were also owned by 
PRC nationals and they did not have any Khmer employees to 
check if the Khmer script on signs was correct. The report also 
pointed out that the government department in charge of granting 
permissions for signage did not have any official who understood 
Chinese. This is perhaps an area where LEC can come in to 
mediate. It would be interesting for future research to look into 
whether LEC organizations or businesses will be called in to 
address this situation. 
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